It's not about the money. EU funds, local opportunities, and Euroscepticism by Crescenzi, Riccardo et al.
Regional Science and Urban Economics 84 (2020) 103556
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Regional Science and Urban Economics
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/regec
It’s not about the money. EU funds, local opportunities, and Euroscepticism
Riccardo Crescenzi a, Marco Di Cataldo a,b,∗, Mara Giua c
a London School of Economics, United Kingdom
b Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, Italy
c Roma Tre University, Italy
A R T I C L E I N F O
Keywords:
EU funds
Euroscepticism
Cohesion policy
Brexit
Regression discontinuity
A B S T R A C T
Growing Euroscepticism across the European Union (EU) leaves open questions as to what citizens expect to gain
from EU Membership and what influences their dissent for EU integration. This paper looks at the EU Structural
Funds, one of the largest and most visible expenditure items in the EU budget, to test their impact on electoral
support for the EU. By leveraging the Referendum on Brexit held in the United Kingdom, a spatial RDD analysis
offers causal evidence that EU money does not influence citizens’ support for the EU. Conversely, the analysis
shows that EU funds mitigate Euroscepticism only where they are coupled with tangible improvements in local
labour market conditions, the ultimate objective of this form of EU intervention. Money cannot buy love for the
EU, but its capacity to generate new local opportunities certainly can.
1. Introduction
The European Union (EU) is increasingly seen by its detractors as
distant from the real day-to-day economic challenges of its citizens
and as a binding constraint to the capacity of national governments
to deliver a more equitable distribution of prosperity. The inability of
mainstream politics – of which the EU is seen as a natural expression –
to deliver timely and credible answers to the economic needs of large
strata of the electorate has been linked to electoral behaviour by a grow-
ing body of research (Guiso et al., 2017; Rodrik, 2018; Colantone and
Stanig, 2018; Rodríguez-Pose, 2018). The Covid-19 pandemic has fur-
ther exacerbated these tensions with polarised views in different Mem-
ber States on the use of common EU resources to tackle the economic
consequences of the pandemic. The (perceived) reluctance of the EU to
offer timely support in a major emergency has further reinforced anti-
EU sentiments in countries (such as Italy or Spain) where the severity
of the pandemic has been coupled with tighter national budget con-
straints. Eurosceptic feelings tend to spread in the population even if
EU resources are indeed made available after an inevitable negotia-
tion stage. Therefore, it remains unclear how the concrete actions of
the EU can practically influence the electoral preferences of millions
of EU citizens. Economic theory unveils a number of benefits from the
process of economic integration allowed for by the EU (Baldwin and
Wyplosz, 2015) whose importance is magnified in times of crisis. How-
ever, the majority of these benefits materialise through adjustments in
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prices and quantities that are difficult for citizens to link to EU member-
ship. Conversely, a set of concrete policy actions are intended to visibly
and clearly impact the economic opportunities available to EU citizens.
Among those the lion’s share of financial resources goes to regional
development interventions under the EU Cohesion Policy (Begg, 2008),
one of the key financing sources made available by the EU to Mem-
ber States in order to tackle the 2020 crisis induced by the Covid-19
pandemic.
While some evidence has been produced to show that financial dis-
bursement through EU funds is related to lower Eurosceptic feelings
(Borin et al., 2018; Albanese et al., 2019), other studies are more criti-
cal of any direct voting impacts produced by European regional policy
(Bachtrögler and Oberhofer, 2018; Fidrmuc et al., 2019). This suggests
that the role played by EU transfers for the development of pro-Europe
attitudes is highly heterogeneous. What makes EU Cohesion resources
spread ‘love’ for the European Union remains to be explored.
Under what conditions (if at all) can EU Cohesion Policy influence
support for the European Union? Is it the capacity of EU funds to deliver
enhanced economic opportunities in the areas targeted by Cohesion Pol-
icy that pays off in the ballots? If the fundamental drive for anti-system
votes rests on economic motivations, improvements in local economic
conditions experienced by voters in beneficiary areas should – ceteris
paribus – improve their preferences for EU integration.
We address these research questions by focusing on the context
offering arguably the most limpid case of a democratic vote either in
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favour or against the European Union, the 2016 United Kingdom Refer-
endum on EU membership. The Brexit vote represents the ideal setting
to investigate the impact of EU funds on Euroscepticism, not only for
the nature of the vote being explicitly and uniquely centred on the EU,1
but also because in the UK some areas have received very large pro-
portions of financial aid in the form of EU Structural Funds over the
last years. In these places, voters at the 2016 Referendum were not just
choosing the future of their country within or outside the EU, but they
were also expressing their preference on whether to retain EU financial
support.
The impact of EU policies on the Referendum results is estimated by
adopting a boundary RDD methodology. We exploit the border between
a region classified as ‘in highest need of financial help’ by the EU at the
time of the vote, West Wales and The Valley, and a region receiving
a much lower intensity of EU aid, East Wales. To investigate the pres-
ence of a causal link between Cohesion Policy and ‘Remain’ votes, we
compare voting outcomes for micro-aggregated units (electoral wards)
on the two sides of the border. Our results document that EU Cohesion
Policy help in ‘spreading love’ for the EU only if citizens witness clear
improvements in their living standards during the funding period. Pub-
lic support for EU Membership is found to be more sustained in areas
receiving higher shares of EU funds and – at the same time - witnessing
larger improvements in local labour market conditions. Conversely, EU
funding per se appears to be unable to systematically influence voting
behaviour.
We capture the economic dynamism of local areas in the pre-Brexit
Referendum period through the decrease in the unemployment rate
over the period in which the case-study region, West Wales and the
Valley, has had access to the highest proportion of development funds
from the EU. We find evidence that local areas receiving higher pro-
portions of EU funds and displaying stronger dynamism in their labour
market - possibly induced by EU interventions - are comparatively more
likely to vote in favour of remaining in the European Union.
Therefore, in line with the literature assigning a key role to socio-
economic dynamics in shaping Eurosceptic and populistic votes (Colan-
tone and Stanig, 2018; Rodríguez-Pose, 2018; Guiso et al., 2017), our
evidence supports the idea that the economic dynamism of local areas
mediates the role of EU Structural Funds for Eurosceptic preferences.
Taken together, these results indicate that voting preferences of citi-
zens are not responsive to EU financial assistance, unless EU interven-
tions are capable of promoting tangible improvements in their daily
life, such as new employment opportunities.
This paper relates to different strands of literature. First, it con-
tributes to the rich literature on the impact of Cohesion Policy (Mohl
and Hagen, 2010; Becker et al., 2010, 2013, 2018), and more specifi-
cally the growing, yet still underexplored field of research linking EU
funds with the public support for the European Union (Dellmuth and
Chalmers, 2018; Bachtrögler and Oberhofer, 2018; Borin et al., 2018;
Fidrmuc et al., 2019). The mixed evidence emerging from these recent
studies leaves the issue of whether areas receiving higher proportions of
EU Structural Funds develop a more favourable view of Europe because
of EU financial help still unsolved. In addition, this literature is silent
on whether the effect of EU funding on public support towards the
EU materialises under key conditions in place in the territories where
public investment through Cohesion Policy takes place. Our contribu-
tion aims to assess the impact of EU funds by adopting counterfactual
methodologies allowing us to uncover clear causal impacts: our focus
on the UK context lends itself to this type of analysis due to the Refer-
endum on EU membership held in the country in 2016.
1 While any election featuring Eurosceptic parties enables voters to express
anti-EU preferences, what makes the Brexit Referendum unique is that all voters
opting for ‘Leave’ – even if not explicitly driven by resentments against the EU
– expressed a clear and unambiguously Eurosceptic choice. Differently, votes
for anti-Europe parties at national elections may be completely unrelated with
their Eurosceptic platform.
Second, the paper speaks to the literature analysing the causes of
anti-establishment, extremist and populist votes, which has been boom-
ing in recent years (Barone et al., 2016; Autor et al., 2016; Algan et al.,
2017; Halla et al., 2017; Guiso et al., 2017; Dustmann et al., 2017; Boeri
et al., 2018; Rodrik, 2018). The electoral victory of ‘Leave’ supporters
at the Brexit Referendum of 2016 is commonly regarded as one of the
first signs of the recent anti-systemic and populistic wave characterising
Western politics. To our knowledge, our paper is the first to specifically
focus on the conditions under which public investment may shape this
kind of electoral preferences.
In order to elicit citizens’ preferences for the EU we leverage the
Brexit vote. Therefore, our paper also contributes to the literature on
the determinants of Brexit. In this literature, recent contributions have
highlighted the primary role of economic conditions faced by voters
to explain the Referendum result (Becker et al., 2017; Colantone and
Stanig, 2018; Arnorsson and Zoega, 2018; Alabrese et al., 2019; Fet-
zer, 2019). As such, it may be expected that EU policies – having
enhanced the economic performance of some UK poorer regions (Di
Cataldo, 2017; Di Cataldo and Monastiriotis, 2020; Crescenzi and Giua,
2020) – may influence the political preferences of voters as well. The
works focusing specifically on the relationship between EU funds and
the Brexit Referendum have obtained mixed results. They either report
a significant association, suggesting that areas receiving more money
from the EU have voted Remain more (Huggins, 2018) or report no sig-
nificant relationship (Fidrmuc et al., 2019). These studies, however, are
performed for relatively large aggregated units and without attempt-
ing to identify causal impacts. In addition, the divergent results might
suggest the omission of more fundamental local factors mediating the
impact of EU funds on electoral support for the EU.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 dis-
cusses institutional background, case study and data; section 3 presents
the empirical setting and the models; section 4 reports the empirical
results; section 5 discusses and interprets the findings; section 6 con-
cludes.
2. Institutional background and data
2.1. EU Cohesion Policy in the UK at the time of the Brexit Referendum
One third of the total budget of the European Union is absorbed
by the EU Cohesion Policy. For the ongoing (2014–2020) program-
ming period, the EU is spending 352 billion euros on Cohesion Policy,
most of which is directed towards economically disadvantaged territo-
ries across the continent, i.e. the regions classified as ‘less developed’.
Investment projects financed with these resources are intended to build
new infrastructure, foster innovation, promote the development of busi-
nesses, generate employment opportunities and tackle social exclusion.
In the UK, this investment policy has extensively financed disad-
vantaged territories since the early 80s. Eligibility for EU funding is
assigned to so-called ‘NUTS2’2 regions before the beginning of each
EU seven-year programming period. During the ongoing 2014–2020 EU
budget period, the UK regions classified as ‘less developed’– and hence
entitled to receive the highest form of EU financial support – were West
Wales and the Valleys in Wales, and Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly
in England (Fig. 1). These two regions, the poorest of the country, are
those with a regional GDP per capita below 75% of the EU average
(European Commission, 2014). Both of them received the status of ‘less
developed’ in the year 2000, and have been continuously financed by
2 The NUTS classification (Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics) is
a system used to divide the EU territory in homogeneous units for statistical
purposes. The NUTS1 level represents major socio-economic areas, often corre-
sponding to the national level. The NUTS2 level identifies sub-national regions
(often with administrative autonomy) and is used to determine eligibility for
EU Cohesion Policy funds.
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Fig. 1. Eligibility for EU funds to ‘less developed’ regions at the time of the Ref-
erendum on Brexit. Note: units are NUTS2 regions; red: ‘less developed’ regions
during 2014-2020 EU programming period.
the EU via this funding scheme since then (Di Cataldo, 2017). Taken
together, these regions account for less than 4% of the total UK popula-
tion, yet they were entitled to receive around 26% of the total amount
of EU development funds allocated to the UK. Remaining EU funds in
the UK have been spread across all other regions of the country.
In areas considered ‘in highest need of financial help’ by the EU and
highly-financed through Cohesion Policy, EU funds represent a con-
siderable source of public investment. This is also due to the way in
which ordinary public resources are disbursed by the UK Government
across the country. While EU funds are concentrated in less developed
areas, the UK Government gives a limited importance to initial socio-
economic disadvantage in its funding allocation.3 Hence, while in richer
UK regions EU funds represent a small portion of total public expendi-
ture, in poorer areas the total investment for economic development
would have been much lower in absence of Cohesion Policy. To see
this, we can compare EU and UK expenditures in Wales in 2014 as an
example. In that year, West Wales and The Valley received around €290
million in EU funds, while total EU expenditure in Wales (including
East Wales) sum up to €305 million. The total UK Government capital
3 This is exemplified by the fact that UK national expenditure for ‘Economic
affairs’ in the richest region of the country, the London metropolitan
area, is comparable to the amount invested in Wales (£711 per person
and £751 per person, respectively, in 2014). Data on UK Government
spending retrieved from https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/public-
expenditure-statistical-analyses-pesa.
expenditure for ‘Economic affairs’ (a spending category roughly corre-
sponding to the main objectives of EU funds) in Wales in the same year
amounts to £845 million. Hence, about 30% of total capital investments
in Wales have been made through Cohesion Policy, a percentage which
is much higher if we only focus on West Wales and The Valley.
For the 2014–2020 period, the UK is the second largest net contrib-
utor to the EU budget, after Germany. The difference between expenses
towards the EU and received funds from Brussels amounts to around
10 billion Euros (House of Commons, 2018). In light of this, it is not
surprising that a recurring argument brought forward by proponents
of Brexit during the Referendum campaign was that leaving the EU
would save financial resources to be spent on other priorities, such as
financing the public healthcare system. Conversely, EU Cohesion Pol-
icy was barely mentioned during the campaign. The arguments used
by Eurosceptic leaders, and the highly unequal distribution of EU funds
across the country – with richer regions receiving little in per capita
terms, and poorer regions receiving much more – implies that, in order
to study the impact of Cohesion Policy on the Referendum’s outcome,
it is worth focusing our attention on areas where EU expenditure truly
represents a vital portion of total public investment. Moreover, the high
degree of heterogeneity across the UK implies that empirical models try-
ing to capture the effect of EU funds on Brexit by focusing on the entire
country (Becker et al., 2017) may fail to account for key idiosyncratic
and unobservable characteristics of highly-funded territories.
2.2. Wales as a case-study
The Welsh Nation is divided into two NUTS2 regions, East Wales
and West Wales and The Valley, one of which is entitled to receive
the highest form of EU aid.4 The geographical boundary between these
two regions was set up in 1998, determining the regions′ eligibility
for EU funding during the 2000–2006 programming period (Gripaios
and Bishop, 2006). West Wales and The Valley was considered a ‘less
developed’ region by the EU for the first time in 2000, and has main-
tained its status until today. This has entitled the region to receive large
portions of EU funds, equal to around 2 billion Euros during each of the
2000–2006, 2007–2013, and 2014–2020 periods. In comparison, East
Wales has been committed by the EU around 300 million Euros for each
of the 7-year budgetary periods.
Geolocalised data on EU funds beneficiaries5 for the 2007–2013
period allow us to visualise the geographical distribution of EU devel-
opment projects across Wales. Fig. 2 shows that a very large portion
of financial resources have been received and spent in the vicinity of
the border between East and West Wales, on the Western side. The
concentration of projects on the South-Eastern side of the boundary,
clearly visible in Fig. 2, corresponds to Cardiff, Wales’ capital. This city
acts as ‘managing authority’ for all EU funds in the Welsh Nation, that
is, it is responsible for receiving funds from Brussels and redistribut-
ing them within Wales. While most of the beneficiary-level expendi-
ture data record the location of their actual beneficiary, others are still
registered with the Welsh Government Offices in Cardiff. Much of this
4 Unlike other European countries, UK NUTS2 regions are used exclusively for
EU funding purposes, having no administrative or political meaning (Gripaios
and Bishop, 2006). This makes local areas belonging to neighbouring NUTS2
regions more similar than in other countries, as the regional boundaries used
for EU funds eligibility are often unrelated to any social, political or cultural
characteristics.
5 We are thankful to Julia Bachtrögler for kindly sharing these data with us.
For further details on this dataset on EU funds beneficiaries for the 2007–2013
period across the European Union see Bachtrögler et al. (2019). The dataset also
provides details on the declaration date of each regional list of beneficiaries.
In the case of the operational programme ‘West Wales and the Valleys’, the
submission date was the 25th of August 2016. As such, all beneficiaries at the
time of the Brexit Referendum (23rd June 2016) are accounted for.
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Fig. 2. Distance from treatment border and EU funds beneficiaries in Wales. Note: the dashed line indicates the border of Wales, the red thick continuous line
indicates the treatment border between East Wales and West Wales.
money has likely been spent across Wales, mainly on the Western side.6
However, given that we are unable to say what exact proportion of the
funds officially recorded in Cardiff has been spent somewhere else, our
estimates are performed both with and without Cardiff wards in the
sample (cfr. Section 4.2) and our preferred specifications are the latter,
i.e. excluding Cardiff.
A further issue with beneficiary-level data is that they only cover
approximately 60% of total EU funds to Wales. The remaining 40% is
either not recorded in the beneficiaries’ dataset, or are projects with no
single beneficiary and distributed across many different locations. For
this reason, data on beneficiaries do not seem appropriate to identify
‘treated’ wards, as several wards in which expenditures are not recorded
might have in fact received European funds.
Even with these important limitations, beneficiary-level data
allowed us to identify a clear discontinuity in terms of EU resources
spent on the two sides of the border (Fig. 2). A large share of the EU
projects implemented in West Wales appear to be concentrated in the
white area of Fig. 2, i.e. less than 10 km away from the boundary sep-
arating the region from East Wales. This pattern can be further appre-
ciated in Figure A1 in the Appendix, displaying average EU spending
per capita in distance bins on both sides of the East Wales-West Wales
border (both including and excluding Cardiff).
In addition, in Table A1 (panel A) we regress the proportion of
EU funds per capita on a dummy variable defining whether a ward
belongs to West Wales, excluding Cardiff from the sample. For all
samples considered (all wards of Wales, wards within 50 km and
wards within 10 km from the East-West border) we obtain a positive
and significant coefficient of the West Wales dummy, indicating that
West Wales′ wards near the border have received and spent compara-
tively more EU funds than East Wales’ wards – approximately 400–500
Euros per inhabitant more, on the basis of 2007–2013 beneficiary data.
Hence, the setting in Wales appears suitable for a causal investiga-
tion of the impact of EU funds on Brexit Referendum results, although
the limitations in the beneficiary data make them not fully reliable,
6 Some of the funds reporting the Welsh Government in Cardiff as beneficiary
have been geocoded in the area where the money has been spent by exploiting
the description of the projects. As an example, one of the largest projects in the
data is described as the ‘Dualling of the A465 between Tredegar and Brynmawr’.
While this is officially recorded with the Welsh Government (Department for
Economy, Science & Transport) as beneficiary, it was possible to locate the
investment in West Wales, in the exact place where the A465 road is.
when it comes to understanding the intensity of EU funding in eligible
wards.
When analysing the impact of EU funds on local electoral outcomes,
Cornwall may seem an additional ideal case study. Wales and Cornwall
are the two UK regions classified as ‘less developed’ for EU funding
purposes at the time of the Referendum (Fig. 1). However, from what
geolocalised data on EU funds beneficiaries suggest, funding in Corn-
wall has mainly been spent in wards located away from the border
separating Cornwall from Devon.7 This can clearly be seen in Table A1,
reporting EU funds per inhabitant in the region. It can be noted that a
significant difference in EU funding is visible only when moving away
from the Cornwall-Devon border, but not within 10 km from the bor-
der. The table also shows that the number of observations in the vicinity
of the border between Cornwall and Devon is much lower than in the
case of Wales, for the same distance thresholds. In addition, it should
be noted that the geo-localisation of a significant portion of EU funding
is missing, with expenditure distributed across several locations within
Cornwall. As a result, the information in our possession does not pro-
vide sufficient evidence that Cornwall would be a setting suitable for
a causal RDD analysis. Therefore, it is discarded as an additional case-
study.
2.3. Data
To measure Eurosceptic (‘leave the EU’ vs. ‘remain in the EU’) votes
at the 2016 UK Referendum on Brexit we rely on unique data on the
Referendum results at the level of electoral wards, made available to
us by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). This database has
been compiled by BBC experts by sending individual emails to all UK
Constituencies after the Referendum was held, on the basis of the UK
Freedom of Information (FOI) Act, and combining together all responses
in a homogeneous database at the ward level.
Our dataset is completed with information on socio-economic,
labour market and demographic ward-level characteristics extracted
from the UK Census (2001 and 2011) conducted by the UK Office for
National Statistics (ONS). All variables on employment and industrial
structure are normalised by the number of 16–74 year old residents in
each ward. We use these variables to test the balancing properties of
7 A ‘visual’ representation of this, through a map similar to Fig. 2 (but specif-
ically on Cornwall), is available upon request from the authors.
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our setting and to study the conditioning impact of EU funds on the
Referendum results. Our analysis also exploits data on the geographical
distance in km of each electoral ward from the border between East
Wales and West Wales, calculated with the ArcGIS software. Finally,
the dataset is completed with information on EU funds beneficiaries in
Wales discussed in section 2.2. Descriptive statistics for all variables
used in the analysis are reported in Table A2 in the Appendix.
3. Empirical design
3.1. Identification strategy and empirical models
The fundamental identification problem of our analysis lies in the
difficulty of controlling for any element correlated with European poli-
cies and potentially influencing voting preferences. A large number of
unobservable local area characteristics may be confounding our esti-
mates. To get around this issue, we exploit the geographical distribu-
tion of Cohesion Policy support in Wales to estimate the effect of Cohe-
sion Policy on the Brexit Referendum through a regression discontinu-
ity design (RDD) approach. The boundary separating the Welsh area
highly-funded by the EU (i.e. West Wales and The Valley) and a less
funded area (i.e. East Wales) is used to define the treatment and con-
trol group in a quasi-experimental setting. The analysis is performed at
the level of electoral wards. Fig. 2 illustrates the wards in Britain and
their distance from the treatment border. As mentioned above, if EU
beneficiary data were more accurate, we would have used this source
to define a continuous ‘treatment’ variables based on actual expendi-
ture. However, given that the exact location of around 40% of total
EU spending remains unknown, we are forced to follow the existing
literature on this topic, identify the treatment in the eligibility sta-
tus (dummy variable taking value 1 for all wards belonging to West
Wales and The Valley) and conduct our test in a sharp spatial RDD
setting.
From the seminal work of Holmes (1998), spatial RDD has been
applied to different fields of investigation. This counterfactual method
is particularly suitable to capture the effects of ‘spatially-targeted’ poli-
cies, as it allows to exploit geographical distance as a forcing variable
that randomly defines treatment and control units (Black, 1999; Lalive,
2008; Dell, 2010; Lee and Lemieux, 2010; Gibbons et al., 2013; Giua,
2017). The underlying idea behind the spatial RDD approach is that
any characteristics must be smoothly distributed across the boundary,
with the exception of the treatment itself (Black, 1999). By balancing
observational units according to their distance from the boundary, the
treatment (in our case: eligibility for the highest form of EU aid) is
smoothly distributed across the boundary and its impact is isolated from
any possible confounding factor, provided that assignment to the treat-
ment cannot be manipulated.
Our spatial forcing variable is hence the geographical distance from
the regional border. To allow for more flexibility in our estimates, the
forcing variable enters in the model specifications as polynomials up to
the third order. In addition, following a consolidated practice in spatial
RDD studies (Holmes, 1998; Black, 1999; Jofre-Monseny, 2014) our
specifications are based on samples made of units in the immediate
proximity of the border. In our core specifications this entails focusing
on (1) all wards of Wales, or (2) all wards within 50 km from the treat-
ment border, or (3) all wards within 10 km from the treatment border.
The baseline model is as follows:
Rw = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1Tw +
3∑
𝜌=1
𝛾𝜌(fw)𝜌 + Tw
3∑
𝜌=1
𝛾𝜌(fw)𝜌 + ew
Where Rw is the share of Remain votes in the Brexit Referendum in ward
w; Tw is the treatment variable, a dummy equal to 1 for wards belonging
to the Welsh region most targeted by EU Cohesion Policy (West Wales
and The Valley) and 0 otherwise; fw is the forcing variable, the distance
from the border in km, also interacted with the treatment variable. fw
enters either linearly or as a third order polynomial. Standard errors
are clustered at the level of Local Authority.8
Besides identifying the average treatment effect (ATE) of EU
regional policy on voting outcomes, our analysis aims at capturing how
the effect of EU transfers on Euroscepticism varies with changes in liv-
ing conditions in the areas targeted by the policy. In particular, we
estimate the effect of EU funds on voting preferences in presence of
‘labour market dynamism’, proxied by the reduction of unemployment
between 2001 and 2011. The heterogeneous average treatment effect
(H-ATE) model is estimated as follows:
Rw = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1Tw + 𝛽2Uw + 𝛽3(Tw × Uw) +
3∑
𝜌=1
𝛾𝜌(fw)𝜌 + Tw
3∑
𝜌=1
𝛾𝜌(fw)𝜌 + ew
Where Uw represent the socio-economic and labour market dynamism
of local areas, to which EU regional policy is intended to contribute and
that might ideally be improve by successful EU interventions in line
with the key priorities of EU Cohesion Policy. The variable Uw prox-
ies the creation of job opportunities in ward w in the pre-Referendum
period. All other parameters are the same as in model (1). The H-ATE
is estimated by the interaction term between the treatment dummy and
the continuous Uw variable.
3.2. Balancing test
The underlying assumption of a boundary RDD setting is the smooth
distribution of all relevant (observable and unobservable) characteris-
tics across the treatment border. We test the balancing properties of
our empirical setting by checking for a correlation between the treat-
ment dummy variable and a whole set of socio-economic and demo-
graphic variables. These variables are extracted from the UK Census.
They are all measured in 2001 (i.e. at the time in which West Wales
was granted the status of ‘less developed’ status by the EU), or, in the
case of dynamic variables (e.g. Unemployment decrease) they are mea-
sured as differences between 2001 and 2011. The model is estimated for
wards within 50 km from the treatment border, controlling for distance
in km and adding polynomials of level three to assign higher weights to
wards located near the border.9
The results of the test are reported in Table 1. For all variables
we find no evidence of a significant difference across the border. This
increases our confidence that the empirical setting fulfils the require-
ment for an RDD, i.e. treatment and control groups being equal for all
relevant characteristics except for the eligibility for European funds.
Being balanced according to the geographical distance from the bound-
ary, we can assume that the wards belonging to the treated and
untreated regions offer an ‘as good as random’ scenario where all char-
acteristics are smoothly distributed among the two groups (Blundell
and Dias, 2009). The wards’ difference in terms of electoral preferences
on Brexit will be attributed to the unique factor with a discontinuous
geographical distribution, i.e. the Cohesion Policy treatment.
4. Results
4.1. ATE and H-ATE estimates
Table 2 provides the results of the estimation of the baseline model,
8 Local Authorities (LA) are local administrative units in the UK. In Wales
there are 22 LAs in total, of which 15 are in West Wales and The Valley. The
territory of LAs corresponds to that of electoral Constituencies.
9 The balancing test has also been conducted for different samples - all Wales
and 10 km from the border. The results report no systematic difference between
treatment and control groups. The only significant element in these samples is
human capital, marginally significant at 10% level. As a robustness test, we
have replicated all our main estimates with the inclusion of human capital as
control in the regressions. All key findings of the paper are confirmed. These
results are available upon request from the authors.
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Table 1
Balancing test.
Sample: 50 km from border
Dep. var: Unempl. Rate Long-term
unempl.
Youth
unempl.
Unempl.
decrease
LTU decrease Youth
U decrease
Highly-
educated
Log
population
18-24 yo
population
Non-white
population
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
West Wales 0.00438
(0.00309)
0.00184
(0.00129)
0.0127
(0.00884)
−0.00223
(0.00352)
−0.00153
(0.00210)
−0.000248
(0.000899)
−0.0198
(0.0196)
0.112
(0.237)
−0.00367
(0.00884)
−0.00363
(0.00783)
Observations 1057 1057 1057 1057 1057 1057 1057 1057 1057 1057
R-squared 0.086 0.123 0.054 0.077 0.085 0.027 0.087 0.159 0.116 0.354
Employment in:
Dep var.: Agriculture ManufacturingConstruction Mining Public
admin
Wholesale
& retail
Finance Real
estate
Health
services
Transport
(11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20)
West Wales −0.0125
(0.0129)
0.00520
(0.0183)
0.000665
(0.00339)
0.000654
(0.00149)
0.00324
(0.00402)
−0.00157
(0.00502)
−0.0033
(0.00364)
−0.00269
(0.00363)
−0.00124
(0.00611)
−0.00265
(0.00299)
Observations 1057 1057 1057 1057 1057 1057 1057 1057 1057 1057
R-squared 0.0420 0.195 0.029 0.051 0.027 0.177 0.171 0.104 0.023 0.199
Note: clustered standard errors at local authority level in parenthesis. ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1. Forcing variable: distance in km from
border between East Wales and West Wales. West Wales: dummy variable taking value 1 for all wards belonging to West Wales and The Valley.
Sample: all wards located 50 km or less from the treatment border, excluding wards from Cardiff. All models estimated with polynomials of order
three interacted with forcing variable and treatment variable. Dependent variables measured in 2001 in all specifications but columns (4), (5),
(6), where they are obtained as difference between 2001 and 2011.
which tests the causal link between EU funds in West Wales and
‘Remain’ votes in the Brexit Referendum. The model is specified with
the forcing variable entering linearly or as third-order polynomial and
by using different RDD bandwidths based on the distance from the bor-
der between East Wales and West Wales. The sample may be composed
by all wards of Wales, or by wards within 50 km or 10 km from the bor-
der on both sides. Our preferred estimates are obtained with third-order
polynomials of distance, following the AIC criteria.
As shown in Table 2, in all these different specifications the coeffi-
cient of the treatment dummy is not statistically significant. We find no
average treatment effect, or no evidence that Welsh wards located in
the region receiving higher EU funds have voted comparatively more
for either ‘Remain’ or ‘Leave’, conditioning on the distance from the
border. We interpret this finding as evidence that more EU funds would
not change the feelings and attitudes of citizens towards the EU10.
The visual representation of this result is illustrated in Fig. 3. The
observations are linearly fitted on the two sides of the border. The
Figure displays no significant jump at the treatment border, confirming
that, on average, people living in areas receiving the highest-possible
level of EU financial aid have not voted differently at the Brexit Refer-
endum from citizens living in much less funded areas.
Having established that a higher intensity of EU funding per se had
no average effect on the Referendum′s outcome, our next step is to
examine whether EU funds can play a role if they are combined with
the economic transformation of local areas, i.e. exactly the local struc-
tural transformation that the EU Cohesion Policy is intended to pro-
mote through the Structural Funds. In particular, we place our atten-
tion on how the local labour market has evolved in the period preced-
10 This result reinforces the evidence obtained by Fidrmuc et al. (2019). By
running a simple OLS analysis they find that EU regional development funds
at NUTS2 level are not significantly associated with UK voters’ decisions at the
Referendum on Brexit.
ing the vote11,12. Territories displaying a higher local labour market
dynamism, where socio-economic conditions have improved while EU
funds have been flowing in, may be interpreted by citizens as a suc-
cess of European policies and therefore produce a stronger sense of EU
belonging, translating into more support for the EU and more ‘Remain’
votes.
While pro-Europe positions may be fuelled by the perceived suc-
cess of EU policies, the opposite can also be true. Worsening economic
and labour performance of local areas targeted by Cohesion Policy may
make these constituencies more likely to vote against EU membership.
Individuals experiencing social exclusion, job losses, or deprivation are
more prone to develop feelings of discontent with ‘mainstream’ politics.
This is particularly true if socio-economic decline is spatially concen-
trated, as widespread disadvantage in local communities of ‘left behind’
places leads to the development of negative collective emotions and
political discontent (Rodríguez-Pose, 2018; Altomonte et al., 2019). In
areas eligible for EU Structural Funds, voters may assign the respon-
sibility for declining economic trajectories and for their deteriorating
living conditions to the process of EU integration (through competition
in the product and factor markets as well as higher environmental and
quality standards), blaming the EU for the failure of public policies to
mitigate these effects and compensate losers. This would induce local
citizens to vote against the EU.
We calculate the change in unemployment between the two latest
available Censuses, i.e. 2001 and 2011. As West Wales obtained the sta-
tus of ‘less developed’ region from the EU in 2000, this variable approx-
imates labour market conditions in the region at the beginning of the
period of high funding, before EU funds for ‘less developed’ regions
could produce large effects. The difference between unemployment in
11 As the main objective of EU regional policy is the promotion of ‘smart,
sustainable and inclusive’ growth in recipient territories (European Commis-
sion, 2014), improvements in the economy and the generation of employment
opportunities represent the expected outcome of policy interventions.
12 In absence of GDP data at the ward level we rely on information about the
unemployment rate, extracted from the Census. Wards are well-suited units to
capture localised unemployment clusters. This is because most ward boundaries
have been used by the UK Office for National Statistics to draw Output Areas
(for which labour market and Referendum data are not available), a geograph-
ical classification of socially homogeneous areas in terms of household tenure
and population size.
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Table 2
Baseline RDD results - ATE model.
Dep. variable: Share of Remain votes
Wales <50 km <10 km Wales <50 km <10 km
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
West Wales 0.00763
(0.0207)
−0.0319
(0.0191)
−0.00636
(0.0171)
−0.0127
(0.0166)
0.00354
(0.0200)
−0.00715
(0.0175)
Polynomial 1–1 1–1 1–1 3–3 3–3 3–3
Observations 823 1315 422 823 1315 422
Mean of dep. variable 0.465 0.467 0.447 0.465 0.467 0.447
R-squared 0.075 0.102 0.004 0.327 0.140 0.027
Best polynomial degree (AIC) ✓ ✓ ✓
Note: clustered standard errors at local authority level in parenthesis. ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1. Forcing variable: distance
in km from border between East Wales and West Wales. West Wales: dummy variable taking value 1 for all wards belonging to West
Wales and The Valley. Samples: all wards of Wales (columns (1),(4)), all wards located 50 km or less from the treatment border
(columns (2),(5)), all wards located 10 km or less from the treatment border (columns (3),(6)). Cardiff wards excluded. Models
estimated with polynomials of order one (columns (1)–(3)) or order three (columns (4)–(6)) interacted with forcing variable and
treatment variable.
Fig. 3. ATE model - RDD plot. Note: each data point represents the bin sam-
ple average for distance from treatment border, the straight line is a first-order
polynomial in distance from border fitted separately on each side of the treat-
ment boundary. Sample of Wales wards. 95% confidence intervals are shown.
2001 and unemployment in 2011 captures the decrease in unemployment
in ward w over a 10-year period preceding the Referendum. At least in
part, this decrease may have been produced by EU development inter-
ventions.
As for model (1), model (2) is estimated using different band-
widths and with the forcing variable entering with different polynomial
degrees. The results are shown in Table 3. First, it can be noted that,
again, the West Wales dummy alone reports an insignificant coefficient
across all specifications. The variable approximating local labour mar-
ket dynamism, Unemployment decrease, is computed in such a way
that a higher value corresponds to a higher reduction in the unem-
ployment rate. This variable displays a significant and positive coef-
ficient in some specifications – confirming the role of labour market
dynamics as a driver of Euroscepticism – and it is insignificant oth-
erwise. Crucially, the interaction term between the treatment dummy
and the variable proxying labour improvements (U decrease) returns
a positive and significant coefficient in all but one specifications. This
indicates that wards within the highly-funded West Wales where labour
market conditions have improved the most before the Referendum have
been more prone to vote in favour of remaining in the EU. The esti-
mated marginal effects for both West Wales and East Wales, obtained
with a 10 km bandwidth, are displayed in Figure A2. A one percentage
point reduction in unemployment in West Wales wards translates into
approximately a 1.8pp increase in Remain votes, while in East Wales a
similar decrease in unemployed is linked to an increase of around 0.5pp
Remain votes, i.e. a differential of over 1 percentage point.
4.2. Robustness checks
The results in section 4.1 suggest that citizens living in areas eli-
gible for the highest amount of EU Structural Funds and experiencing
improvements in their local labour market have been more inclined to
express a pro-Europe vote at the Referendum on Brexit. In this section,
we test the robustness of this result in a number of ways.
First, our preferred samples are obtained by excluding wards of
Cardiff, for the reasons explained in section 2. Table A3 in the Appendix
reports the results of the H-ATE model obtained if Cardiff wards are
included in the sample. Again we find that EU funds for ‘less developed’
regions have had no direct impact on the Referendum, while financial
aid from the EU is associated with a higher share of Remain votes if
combined with reductions in unemployment taking place in beneficiary
areas.
As a second test on the H-ATE results, we modify the bandwidths
used to define the treatment and control sample. More specifically, we
test the results using wards located within 5 km, 15 km, 30 km, and
40 km on the two sides of the treatment border. The results, shown
in Table A4 in the Appendix, confirm that the combination of high EU
funding and improved labour conditions is significantly related to fewer
Eurosceptic votes.
As a third robustness test, we adopt different proxies for labour mar-
ket improvements to interact with the treatment dummy variable. We
again rely on the Census and compute the variation in long-term unem-
ployment rate and youth unemployment rate13 in a similar way to how
the unemployment decrease variable has been created. That is, we cal-
culate the difference between the variables′ latest available value (Cen-
sus 2011) and their value when West Wales obtained the status of ‘less
developed’ region (Census 2001). While similar to the original vari-
able on unemployment rate, these indicators capture slightly different
dynamics. The long-term unemployment change reflects the capacity of
the labour market to absorb more marginalised workers, often socially
excluded, while the variation in youth unemployment describes how
difficult it is for people to find their first jobs. The results of these tests
are reported in Tables A5 and A6 in the Appendix. In all specifications
the interaction terms have positive coefficients, most of the time statis-
tically significant. This appears to confirm that the creation of labour
13 Following International Labour Organisation (ILO) definitions, long-term
unemployment rate corresponds to people seeking employment for one year or
longer. Youth unemployment refers to unemployment of the 18–24 year old
population.
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Table 3
EU funds, unemployment reduction, and Brexit – H-ATE model.
Dep. variable: Share of Remain votes
Wales <50 km <10 km Wales <50 km <10 km
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
West Wales 0.0190
(0.0207)
−0.00556
(0.0191)
0.00223
(0.0157)
−0.00509
(0.0166)
0.00895
(0.0197)
0.00114
(0.0167)
U decrease 0.430∗∗∗
(0.132)
−0.588
(0.650)
0.546∗∗
(0.213)
0.416∗∗∗
(0.109)
−0.566
(0.636)
0.485∗∗
(0.202)
West Wales x U decrease 1.361∗
(0.770)
1.573∗∗
(0.793)
1.114∗
(0.680)
0.587
(0.453)
1.559∗
(0.812)
1.173∗
(0.667)
Polynomial 1–1 1–1 1–1 3–3 3–3 3–3
Observations 802 1.057 415 802 1057 415
Mean of dep. variable 0.465 0.466 0.447 0.465 0.466 0.447
R-squared 0.181 0.191 0.139 0.374 0.209 0.154
Best polynomial degree (AIC) ✓ ✓ ✓
Note: clustered standard errors at local authority level in parenthesis. ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1. Forcing variable:
distance in km from border between East Wales and West Wales. West Wales: dummy variable taking value 1 for all wards
belonging to West Wales and The Valley. U decrease: ward-level unemployment rate difference between 2011 and 2001.
Samples: all wards of Wales (columns (1),(4)), all wards located 50 km or less from the treatment border (columns (2),(5)),
all wards located 10 km or less from the treatment border (columns (3),(6)). Cardiff wards excluded. Models estimated with
polynomials of order one (columns (1)–(3)) or order three (columns (4)–(6)) interacted with forcing variable and treatment
variable.
opportunities for the most disadvantaged and for the youngest tends to
be linked with a stronger support for EU membership in areas eligible
for EU transfers.
Displacement effects of place-based policies may be substantial
(Einio and Overman, 2020). As a fourth test, we attempt to minimise
any bias that may have been produced by spillovers driven by the pos-
sibility that wards from East Wales located next to the border have
themselves being influenced by European policies. Some projects may
have been implemented across the border, benefiting both regions,
while some others may have attracted commuters from the Eastern
side. To discard the hypothesis that the main results are driven by
spillovers, we perform a new set of estimates, adopting the same sam-
ple for the treated wards, while removing all wards within 10 km from
the Eastern side of the border. The control group is then shifted 10 km
away from the border.14 Due to this change in sample, the model is
no longer estimated as a spatial RDD, i.e. assigning more weight to
observations located near the border by means of controlling for dis-
tance. Given that balancing properties no longer apply to the samples,
we include in the model a set of observable covariates as controls.
We add all variables used for the balancing test reported in Table 1.
By using this methodology we estimate both the direct impact of EU
funds and the effect of Structural Funds in wards where conditions
have improved the most. The results of these estimates, illustrated in
Table A7, confirm the insignificant role of EU funds for Brexit (columns
(1)–(3)) if not combined with positive labour market dynamics
(columns (4)–(6)).
In one additional robustness test, we replace the West Wales treat-
ment dummy with our beneficiary variables in Table A8. While this
indicator only covers a portion of all EU money spent in Wales (approx-
imately 60%), as shown in Table A1 the variable correlates well with
the West Wales dummy. We control again for Census characteristics
and test the model for all Welsh wards (columns (1), (3), Table A8)
and all Welsh wards excluding Cardiff (columns (2), (4), Table A8).
When testing the relationship between beneficiaries of EU funds and
the Brexit Referendum once again we find no evidence that high recipi-
ents of EU resources have voted differently from less funded areas, and
we also confirm that highly-funded wards in which unemployment has
decreased more have voted Remain more.
14 This implies that by definition Cardiff wards are excluded from the sample,
given that they are all located less than 10 km from the treatment border.
Finally, we further test the robustness of the significance of our main
coefficients by introducing a bootstrapping procedure. When using
Local Authorities for standard errors clustering we have a maximum
of 52 clusters, which is a relatively low number, equal or lower than
the rule of thumb for the minimum number of clusters for the standard
clustering procedure (Bertrand et al., 2004). We therefore replicate the
estimates in Tables 2 and 3 bootstrapping standard errors. We adopt
the wild-bootstrapping procedure using the boottest command (Rood-
man et al., 2019). We bootstrap clusters adopting, again, Local Author-
ities as clusters. Standard errors and t-statistics are obtained performing
999 replications and with Rademacher weights. The results, shown in
Table A9, report wild-bootstrapped t-statistics in parenthesis. In terms
of statistical significance, these estimates appear perfectly in line with
our main specifications in Tables 2 and 3.
5. Discussion
The evidence produced in section 4 indicates that the effect of Euro-
pean funds on pro-Europe voting outcomes only materialises under cer-
tain conditions. We find that the dynamics of the local labour market
are crucial to explain the voting preferences of citizens in the areas
highly subsidised by the EU.
Job creation and unemployment reduction are among the main
goals of EU policies. Therefore, citizens may view improvements in
local labour market conditions as a tangible way for EU projects to
deliver concrete benefits. Our results seem to suggest that people who
perceive or experience personal benefits from Cohesion Policy (and pos-
sibly EU policies in general) are more prone to appreciate the policy
and its promoters. This explanation would fit within the economic util-
itarian theory of European integration, according to which the loyalty
to the idea of Europe depends on the perceived benefits that further
integration can offer (Gabel and Whitten, 1997).
While we cannot directly measure the extent to which the observed
reduction in unemployment (a proxy for the creation of local labour
market opportunities) is directly caused by EU policies, our findings
entail that if EU projects are capable of producing strong and visi-
ble effects on local labour markets – e.g. by fostering employment for
socially excluded and young people – this would translate into a lower
level of Euroscepticism and higher electoral support for the EU.
The impact of EU subsidies on European attitudes, conditional on
the effectiveness of EU policies, can be indirectly examined by looking
at key elements facilitating the profitable use of Structural Funds. One
factor increasing the local capacity to absorb EU transfer and obtain
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higher economic returns from them is the presence of highly-educated
individuals (Becker et al., 2013). The endowment of skilled workers
enables technology adoption (Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994) and the effi-
cient management of EU resources (Becker et al., 2013). Therefore, we
can use a proxy for the local level of human capital to check whether
and how this variable relates to EU funds and Euroscepticism.
We approximate the human capital stock in each ward with the
share of tertiary educated individuals, relying on 2001 Census data.
First, we use this variable to test whether it mediates the effect of EU
funds on Brexit as in the case of labour market dynamism, estimat-
ing a new version of the H-ATE RDD model. The results, shown in
Table A10, demonstrate that, although a higher proportion of skilled
workers directly links with more Remain votes, there is no clear evi-
dence that human capital plays a conditional effect on the link between
EU funds and Brexit.
However, our main interest is to verify whether the effect uncov-
ered in section 4 (i.e. the generation of new employment opportuni-
ties makes EU funds positively correlate with a pro-Europe attitude) is
stronger in places endowed with highly-educated people. We do so by
re-estimating the H-ATE model with unemployment reduction as a con-
ditioning variable, similar to what we do in section 4, by splitting the
sample on the basis of higher/lower than average human capital. The
results of Table A11 indicate that the role of labour market dynamism
as mediator of the EU funds’ effect on Brexit is much stronger in areas
endowed with higher human capital.
Hence, the combination of lower unemployment and higher stock
of human capital are the two factors determining a larger effect of
European funds on public support for the EU. In this scheme, human
capital may be capturing local areas’ capacity to absorb EU transfers
and make good use of them, as discussed above. Another interpreta-
tion is that it reflects the awareness of beneficiary wards over the exis-
tence of the policy. Previous evidence suggested a strong association
between the proportion of highly-educated people and the awareness
of Cohesion Policy (Capello and Perucca, 2018; Osterloh, 2011). In the
regions in receipt of EU funding through Cohesion Policy, EU invest-
ment efforts are better known where human capital is higher. If we
follow this interpretation and apply it to our setting, the differential
conditioning impact of unemployment decrease depending on the level
of human capital, as shown in Table A11, suggests where voters were
aware of the EU funds received by West Wales they were also more
likely to relate improvements in local labour market condition to the
effect of EU policies.
6. Conclusions
This paper has investigated the extent to which Eurosceptic vot-
ing preferences can be influenced by EU policies. It leverages the case
of the EU Structural Funds, the key EU policy tool targeting employ-
ment and economic opportunities; i.e. the same economic challenges
that have been linked to the world-wide rise of anti-system electoral
preferences. The study exploits a quasi-experimental setting in the UK
context, where some territories were classified as ‘in highest need’ of
socio-economic support by the EU – and hence entitled to receive the
highest form of EU funding – when the Referendum on Brexit was held.
The paper investigates whether this ‘special’ treatment in terms of EU
financial support has influenced the vote in the Referendum in bene-
ficiary areas. The boundary between West Wales and its neighbouring
region – that defines eligibility for EU financial aid - is used to identify
‘treated’ and ‘control’ units and uncover whether and under what con-
ditions EU funding may influence electoral support for EU integration.
Regression discontinuity estimates suggest that, all else equal, wards
targeted by the highest proportion of EU funds have not behaved differ-
ently from less subsidised areas in terms of support for EU membership.
Conversely, voters are more prone to support EUMembership only if EU
funding is coupled with tangible improvements in local labour markets.
A significant decrease in the level of unemployment is robustly linked
with fewer Eurosceptic votes in areas highly-funded by the European
Union, vis-à-vis less well-funded territories.
This result, robust to a full battery of robustness tests, offers (for
the first time) causal evidence that being in receipt of EU funds does
not per se make local citizens more supportive of the European Union.
Only where EU investments are combined with the generation of new
employment opportunities and a positive socio-economic transforma-
tion of local territories – possibly a direct result of EU development poli-
cies – are citizens more likely to electorally support the EU as the pro-
moter of positive change in their surrounding economic environment.
Further empirical tests seem to suggest that labour market dynamism in
beneficiary areas is more likely to lower Eurosceptic votes if citizens are
also more aware of EU interventions, therefore linking positive change
more directly with EU interventions.
These findings are in line with a growing body of evidence on eco-
nomic dynamics as the fundamental driver of anti-establishment and
Eurosceptic voting choices (Guiso et al., 2017; Rodrik, 2018; Colan-
tone and Stanig, 2018; Rodríguez-Pose, 2018). Our findings confirm
that support for the process of European integration is strongly influ-
enced by economic factors, with special reference to labour market
opportunities. What our original results add to the existing discourse
is the role of active public policies in shaping electoral behaviour. Dis-
comfort and resentment of EU citizens can indeed be mitigated and
channelled towards constructive and internationally cooperative polit-
ical options. However, what seems to matter for citizens is not access
to EU funding per se, but rather the capability of these funds to con-
cretely mitigate the lack of economic opportunities and the localised
negative effects of the process of economic integration or economic
shocks.
The Brexit referendum offered a unique opportunity to study the
revealed preferences of UK citizens in terms of their support for the EU,
an area of public policy where opinion polls and surveys have tradition-
ally offered very unreliable insights. If this elicitation of citizens’ prefer-
ences was truly unique, the economic and social challenges faced by UK
voters are common to many other EU citizens. The lack of dynamism of
the Welsh economy (in particular in comparison with other parts of the
country) is not dissimilar to the reality of less developed regions in vir-
tually all EU countries. These regions have received significant support
from the EU to tackle their structural disadvantage with rather mixed
results. The resentment and political disenfranchisement with the EU
where economic opportunities have failed to materialise is a common
trait of the electoral behaviour and political sentiment in the economic
periphery of the EU.
Areas most heavily funded by the EU tend to develop a more
favourable view of Europe if (and only if) citizens observe visible socio-
economic improvements in their local communities with potential per-
sonal benefits from EU intervention. In this perspective, future sup-
port for the process of European integration is highly dependent on
the capacity of all EU policies to deliver concrete benefits to be felt at
the local level. Impactful policies are therefore a fundamental tool to
buy-in citizens into the EU project.
On the verge of an unprecedented global recession triggered by the
Covid-19 pandemic this is both good and bad news for the EU. On the
bright side, under the current circumstances of tight budget constraints,
the EU does not need to spend more in order to consolidate its sup-
port among European citizens. However, skyrocketing unemployment
and worsening economic conditions in most deprived areas are a major
challenge that calls for impactful answers and visible impacts. Money
cannot buy love for the EU, but its capacity to deliver tangible impacts
and generate new local opportunities certainly can.
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Appendix
Fig. A1 EU funds across the treatment border. Note: the dashed black vertical line indicates the treatment border between East Wales and West Wales. Linear fit (continuous) and
lowess (small-dashed) curves on both sides of the border threshold. Upper panel: Cardiff wards excluded; Lower: Cardiff wards included.
Fig. A2 H-ATE – estimated marginal effects.
10
R. Crescenzi et al. Regional Science and Urban Economics 84 (2020) 103556
Table A1
EU funds per inhabitant in less developed regions (beneficiary data).
Dep. var: EU funds per inhabitant (1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Wales
Wales <50 km <10 km
West Wales 542.0∗∗∗
(103.7)
550.0∗∗∗
(122.1)
372.2∗∗
(159.0)
Observations 823 1315 422
R-squared 0.007 0.013 0.007
Panel B: South West of England
SW England <50 km <10 km
Cornwall 559.6∗∗∗
(70.45)
42.61∗∗∗
(11.66)
−41.66
(29.15)
Observations 1009 222 67
R-squared 0.022 0.013 0.021
Note: clustered standard errors at local authority level in parenthesis. ∗∗∗ p < 0.01,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1. EU funds per inhabitant as dependent variable, calculated on
the basis of available beneficiary data. Panel A, column (1): sample of all wards of
Wales; Panel A, column (2): sample of wards within 50 km from the border between
West Wales and East Wales; Panel A, column (3): sample of wards within 10 km from
the border between West Wales and East Wales. West Wales: dummy variable taking
value 1 for all wards belonging to West Wales and The Valley. Cardiff wards excluded.
Panel B, column (1): sample of all wards of South West England; Panel B, column (2):
sample of wards within 50 km from the border between Cornwall and Devon; Panel
B, column (3): sample of wards within 10 km from the border between Cornwall and
Devon. Cornwall: dummy variable taking value 1 for all wards belonging to Cornwall.
Table A2
Descriptive statistics.
Cardiff wards excluded
Wales <50 km <10 km
Variable Obs Mean Std Dev Obs Mean Std Dev Obs Mean Std Dev
Share of Remain votesa 823 0.47 0.05 1315 0.47 0.06 422 0.447 0.037
West Wales 824 0.681 0.466 1315 0.354 0.479 422 0.590 0.492
€ of EU funds (beneficiaries)a 823 398.2 3047 1315 219.0 2344 422 387.2 5052
Unemployment decreaseb 803 −0.006 0.012 1057 −0.008 0.012 415 −0.009 0.010
Long-term unemployment decreaseb 803 −0.005 0.007 1057 −0.006 0.007 415 −0.007 0.006
Youth unemployment decreaseb 803 −0.015 0.030 1057 −0.016 0.027 415 −0.019 0.028
Log population 803 7.877 0.549 1057 −0.016 0.027 415 −0.018 0.028
Highly-educated (NVQ4+)a 803 0.124 0.052 1057 8.105 0.633 415 7.983 0.551
Unemploymentb 803 0.034 0.012 1057 0.129 0.057 415 0.121 0.054
Long-term unemploymentb 803 0.011 0.005 1057 0.032 0.013 415 0.033 0.011
Youth unemploymentb 803 0.070 0.031 1057 0.010 0.005 415 0.010 0.005
18-24 yo populationa 803 0.102 0.050 1057 0.064 0.031 415 0.072 0.029
Non-white population 803 0.016 0.019 1057 0.101 0.049 415 0.098 0.029
Agricultural employmentb 803 0.024 0.035 1057 0.020 0.026 415 0.016 0.023
Manufacturing employmentb 803 0.098 0.045 1057 0.021 0.032 415 0.018 0.031
Employment in constructionb 803 0.044 0.011 1057 0.102 0.042 415 0.117 0.041
Employment in miningb 803 0.002 0.003 1057 0.043 0.011 415 0.043 0.010
Employment in public adminb 803 0.037 0.015 1057 0.002 0.003 415 0.002 0.003
Employment in wholesale & retailb 803 0.093 0.019 1057 0.037 0.016 415 0.036 0.015
Employment in financeb 803 0.015 0.009 1057 0.098 0.021 415 0.089 0.017
Employment in real estateb 803 0.046 0.014 1057 0.019 0.012 415 0.017 0.010
Employment in health servicesb 803 0.074 0.020 1057 0.055 0.021 415 0.048 0.015
Employment in transport servicesb 803 0.030 0.010 1057 0.074 0.019 415 0.076 0.021
Note: a/ calculated as share of ward residents; b/ calculated as share of 16–74 year old residents. Labour market and demographic
variables measured in 2001 (source: UK Census).
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Table A3
EU funds, unemployment reduction, and Brexit (Cardiff wards included).
Dep. var.: Share of Remain votes
Wales <50 km <10 km Wales <50 km <10 km
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
West Wales −0.00051
(0.0275)
−0.0220
(0.0243)
−0.0173
(0.0237)
−0.0264
(0.0257)
−0.0174
(0.0298)
−0.0112
(0.0208)
U decrease −0.377
(0.720)
−0.814
(0.611)
−0.671
(1.043)
−0.397
(0.715)
−0.819
(0.621)
−0.596
(0.893)
West Wales x U decrease 1.912∗
(1.045)
1.799∗∗
(0.761)
2.331∗
(1.226)
1.399∗
(0.840)
1.812∗∗
(0.800)
2.255∗∗
(1.096)
Polynomial 1–1 1–1 1–1 3–3 3–3 3–3
Observations 831 1086 444 831 1.086 444
Mean of dep. Variable 0.470 0.470 0.457 0.470 0.470 0.457
R-squared 0.129 0.165 0.131 0.282 0.178 0.147
Best polynomial degree ✓ ✓ ✓
Note: clustered standard errors at local authority level in parenthesis. ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1. Forcing variable:
distance in km from border between East Wales and West Wales. West Wales: dummy variable taking value 1 for all wards
belonging to West Wales and The Valley. U decrease: ward-level unemployment rate difference between 2011 and 2001.
Samples: all wards of Wales (columns (1),(4)), all wards located 50 km or less from the treatment border (columns (2),(5)),
all wards located 10 km or less from the treatment border (columns (3),(6)). Cardiff wards excluded. Models estimated with
polynomials of order one (columns (1)–(3)) or order three (columns (4)–(6)) interacted with forcing variable and treatment
variable.
Table A4
EU funds, unemployment reduction, and Brexit (varying bandwidths).
Dep. var.: Share of Remain votes
<5 km <15 km <30 km <40 km
(1) (2) (3) (4)
West Wales 0.00192
(0.0161)
−0.00249
(0.0163)
0.00773
(0.0176)
0.00453
(0.0179)
U decrease 0.343
(0.392)
0.559∗∗∗
(0.184)
−0.381
(0.430)
−0.859
(0.549)
West Wales x U decrease 1.499∗
(0.811)
1.066∗
(0.629)
1.389∗∗
(0.663)
1.869∗∗
(0.769)
Polynomial 3–3 3–3 3–3 3–3
Observations 261 517 740 897
Mean of dep. Variable 0.446 0.450 0.459 0.462
R-squared 0.235 0.183 0.184 0.150
Best polynomial degree (AIC) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Note: clustered standard errors at local authority level in parenthesis. ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗
p < 0.1. Forcing variable: distance in km from border between East Wales and West Wales. West
Wales: dummy variable taking value 1 for all wards belonging to West Wales and The Valley. U
decrease: ward-level unemployment rate difference between 2011 and 2001. Samples: all wards
located 5 km or less from the treatment border (column (1)), all wards located 15 km or less
from the treatment border (column (2)), all wards located 30 km or less from the treatment
border (column (3)), all wards located 40 km or less from the treatment border (column (4)).
Cardiff wards excluded. Models estimated with polynomials of order three interacted with forcing
variable and treatment variable.
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Table A5
EU funds, long-term unemployment reduction, and Brexit.
Dep. var.: Share of Remain votes
Wales <50 km <10 km Wales <50 km <10 km
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
West Wales 0.0244
(0.0211)
−0.00056
(0.0188)
0.000501
(0.0165)
−0.00041
(0.0163)
0.0134
(0.0188)
−0.00058
(0.0175)
LTU decrease 1.172∗∗
(0.521)
−0.367
(1.078)
1.682∗∗∗
(0.563)
1.134∗∗
(0.430)
−0.294
(1.080)
1.640∗∗∗
(0.565)
West Wales x LTU decrease 2.201∗
(1.300)
2.552∗∗
(1.262)
0.818
(1.201)
1.211
(0.814)
2.454∗
(1.312)
0.812
(1.195)
Polynomial 1–1 1–1 1–1 3–3 3–3 3–3
Observations 802 1.057 415 802 1.057 415
Mean of dep. Variable 0.465 0.466 0.447 0.465 0.466 0.447
R-squared 0.220 0.192 0.152 0.398 0.209 0.161
Best polynomial degree (AIC) ✓ ✓ ✓
Note: clustered standard errors at local authority level in parenthesis. ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1. Forcing variable: distance
in km from border between East Wales and West Wales. West Wales: dummy variable taking value 1 for all wards belonging to
West Wales and The Valley. LTU decrease: ward-level long-term unemployment rate difference between 2011 and 2001. Samples:
all wards of Wales (columns (1),(4)), all wards located 50 km or less from the treatment border (columns (2),(5)), all wards located
10 km or less from the treatment border (columns (3),(6)). Cardiff wards excluded. Models estimated with polynomials of order
one (columns (1)–(3)) or order three (columns (4)–(6)) interacted with forcing variable and treatment variable.
Table A6
EU funds, youth unemployment reduction, and Brexit.
Dep. var.: Share of Remain votes
Wales <50 km <10 km Wales <50 km <10 km
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
West Wales 0.0154
(0.0223)
−0.0148
(0.0189)
−0.00174
(0.0169)
−0.00735
(0.0174)
0.00315
(0.0191)
−0.00167
(0.0178)
Youth U decrease 0.164
(0.602)
0.188
(1.287)
0.0460
(0.535)
0.306
(0.473)
0.172
(1.208)
−0.0366
(0.483)
West Wales x Youth U decrease 2.214∗
(1.115)
1.320
(1.417)
1.818∗
(1.060)
1.279∗
(0.733)
1.384
(1.385)
1.922∗
(1.007)
Polynomial 1–1 1–1 1–1 3–3 3–3 3–3
Observations 802 1057 415 802 1057 415
Mean of dep. variable 0.465 0.466 0.447 0.465 0.466 0.447
R-squared 0.120 0.170 0.040 0.351 0.190 0.060
Best polynomial degree (AIC) ✓ ✓ ✓
Note: clustered standard errors at local authority level in parenthesis. ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1. Forcing variable: distance
in km from border between East Wales and West Wales. West Wales: dummy variable taking value 1 for all wards belonging to West
Wales and The Valley. Youth U decrease: ward-level 16–24 yo unemployment rate difference between 2011 and 2001. Samples: all
wards of Wales (columns (1),(4)), all wards located 50 km or less from the treatment border (columns (2),(5)), all wards located
10 km or less from the treatment border (columns (3),(6)). Cardiff wards excluded. Models estimated with polynomials of order one
(columns (1)–(3)) or order three (columns (4)–(6)) interacted with forcing variable and treatment variable.
Table A7
Test for spillover effects.
Dep. var.: Share of Remain votes Wales <50 km (West Wales)
10–50 km (East Wales)
<10 km (West Wales)
10–20 km (East Wales)
Wales <50 km (West Wales)
10–50 km (East Wales)
<10 km (West Wales)
10–20 km (East Wales)
Control wards < 10 km from border excluded
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
West Wales −0.00190
(0.0222)
0.0265
(0.0190)
−0.0104
(0.0140)
−0.000430
(0.0219)
0.0275
(0.0184)
−0.00177
(0.0134)
U reduction 0.272
(0.437)
−0.0356
(0.479)
−0.553
(0.433)
West Wales x U decrease 1.382∗∗∗
(0.372)
0.832∗∗
(0.390)
1.147∗∗
(0.492)
Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Observation 403 893 207 388 642 168
Mean of dep. variable 0.484 0.477 0.472 0.485 0.479 0.470
R-squared 0.262 0.459 0.404 0.315 0.427 0.604
Note: clustered standard errors at local authority level in parenthesis. ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1. Forcing variable: distance in km from border between East
Wales and West Wales. West Wales: dummy variable taking value 1 for all wards belonging to West Wales and The Valley. Samples: all wards of Wales excluding East
Wales wards less than 10 km from border (columns (1), (4)), all West Wales wards located 50 km or less from the treatment border and East Wales wards between 10
and 50 km from treatment border (columns (2), (5)), all West Wales wards located 10 km or less from the treatment border and East Wales wards between 10 and 20 km
from border (columns (3), (6)). Controls refer to labour market and demographic ward characteristics taken from the Census.
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Table A8
EU funds beneficiaries, unemployment reduction, and Brexit.
Dep. var.: Share of Remain votes
Cardiff excluded Cardiff excluded
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EU funds beneficiaries 1.80e-07
(3.85e-07)
1.28e-07
(5.28e-07)
6.84e-07∗
(2.90e-07)
5.56e-07
(4.26e-07)
U decrease 0.692
(0.847)
1.120
(0.708)
EU funds beneficiaries x U decrease 0.000147∗∗
(5.90e-05)
0.000131∗
(6.60e-05)
Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Observations 852 823 831 802
Mean of dep. variable 0.470 0.465 0.470 0.465
R-squared 0.423 0.383 0.445 0.415
Note: clustered standard errors at local authority level in parenthesis. ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗
p < 0.1. Samples: all Wales wards (columns (1), (3)), all Wales wards excluding wards from Cardiff
(columns (2), (4)). Controls refer to labour market and demographic ward characteristics taken from
the Census.
Table A9
Main results - bootstrapped standard errors.
Dep. var.: Share of Remain votes
Wales <50 km <10 km Wales <50 km <10 km
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
West Wales 0.00763
(0.369)
−0.0319
(-0.803)
−0.00636
(-0.461)
0.0190
(0.921)
−0.00556
(-0.302)
0.00223
(0.142)
U decrease 0.430∗∗
(3.266)
−0.588
(-0.904)
0.546∗
(2.568)
West Wales x U decrease 1.361
(1.435)
1.573∗
(1.985)
1.114∗
(1.758)
Polynomial 1–1 1–1 1–1 1–1 1–1 1–1
Observation 823 1315 422 802 1.057 415
Mean of dep. variable 0.465 0.467 0.447 0.465 0.466 0.447
R-squared 0.075 0.102 0.004 0.181 0.191 0.139
Note: wild-bootstrapped (999 replications) clustered t-statistics in parenthesis. ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1. Forcing
variable: distance in km from border between East Wales and West Wales. West Wales: dummy variable taking value 1 for all
wards belonging to West Wales and The Valley. U decrease: ward-level unemployment rate difference between 2011 and 2001.
Samples: all wards of Wales (columns (1),(4)), all wards located 50 km or less from the treatment border (columns (2),(5)),
all wards located 10 km or less from the treatment border (columns (3),(6)). Cardiff wards excluded. Models estimated with
polynomials of order three interacted with forcing variable and treatment variable.
Table A10
EU funds, human capital, and Brexit.
Dep. var.: Share of Remain votes
Wales <50 km <10 km Wales <50 km <10 km
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
West Wales −0.0167
(0.0204)
−0.0148
(0.0222)
−0.0145
(0.0239)
−0.0177
(0.0179)
0.00552
(0.0246)
−0.0144
(0.0251)
Tertiary educated 0.223∗∗∗
(0.0541)
0.343∗∗∗
(0.104)
0.270∗∗
(0.0995)
0.223∗∗∗
(0.0557)
0.363∗∗∗
(0.107)
0.267∗∗
(0.105)
West Wales x Tertiary educated 0.277∗
(0.135)
0.0444
(0.140)
0.136
(0.173)
0.154
(0.103)
0.0380
(0.144)
0.132
(0.173)
Polynomial 1–1 1–1 1–1 3–3 3–3 3–3
Observations 802 1.057 415 802 1057 415
Mean of dep. variable 0.465 0.466 0.447 0.465 0.466 0.447
R-squared 0.243 0.279 0.239 0.429 0.306 0.243
Best polynomial degree (AIC) ✓ ✓ ✓
Note: clustered standard errors at local authority level in parenthesis. ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1. Forcing variable: distance
in km from border between East Wales and West Wales. West Wales: dummy variable taking value 1 for all wards belonging to
West Wales and The Valley. Tertiary educated: 2001 ward population holding NVQ level 4 or above. Samples: all wards of Wales
(columns (1),(4)), all wards located 50 km or less from the treatment border (columns (2),(5)), all wards located 10 km or less from
the treatment border (columns (3),(6)). Cardiff wards excluded. Models estimated with polynomials of order one (columns (1)–(3)) or
order three (columns (4)–(6)) interacted with forcing variable and treatment variable.
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Table A11
EU funds, unemployment reduction, and Brexit – results by level of human capital.
Dep. var.: Share of Remain votes
Human capital below median
26% holding tertiary education degree)
Human capital above median
(>26% holding tertiary education degree)
Wales <50 km <10 km Wales <50 km <10 km
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
West Wales 0.00062
(0.0193)
0.0178
(0.0219)
−0.0084
(0.0170)
0.0154
(0.0153)
0.0244
(0.0210)
0.0212
(0.0167)
U decrease 0.298
(0.244)
0.722
(0.645)
0.0912
(0.269)
0.341
(0.239)
1.123
(0.931)
0.326
(0.305)
West Wales x U decrease 0.346
(0.418)
1.426∗∗
(0.689)
1.010
(0.587)
2.094∗∗∗
(0.453)
2.541∗
(1.381)
2.247∗
(1.301)
Polynomial 3–3 3–3 3–3 3–3 3–3 3–3
Observations 521 650 278 281 407 137
Mean of dep. variable 0.482 0.481 0.467 0.455 0.456 0.436
R-squared 0.282 0.178 0.139 0.374 0.209 0.217
Best polynomial degree (AIC) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Note: clustered standard errors at local authority level in parenthesis. ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1. Forcing variable: distance
in km from border between East Wales and West Wales. West Wales: dummy variable taking value 1 for all wards belonging to West
Wales and The Valley. U decrease: ward-level unemployment rate difference between 2011 and 2001. Samples: all wards of Wales
(columns (1),(4)), all wards located 50 km or less from the treatment border (columns (2),(5)), all wards located 10 km or less from
the treatment border (columns (3),(6)). Cardiff wards excluded. Models estimated with polynomials of order one (columns (1)–(3))
or order three (columns (4)–(6)) interacted with forcing variable and treatment variable.
Appendix B. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2020.103556.
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